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Decretal Language 
LAST WORDS OF AN APPELLATE OPINION* 
Jon O. Newman† 
Two years ago, I prepared a memorandum for the judges 
of the Second Circuit discussing various aspects of decretal 
language and some of the choices available to judges in 
wording the concluding sentence of their opinions. It has been 
suggested that the discussion might be of use to other judges 
and the bar, and I have therefore adapted the memorandum 
into the following Article. 1. What is “decretal language”? 
“Decretal language” is the portion of a court’s judgment or 
order that officially states (“decrees”) what the court is 
ordering. In a judgment or order, decretal language usually 
begins with the formula “It is hereby ordered, adjudged, and 
decreed that . . . .”  
This Article will consider the portion of an appellate 
court’s opinion, usually the concluding sentence, that states 
what a court of appeals is ordering. The wording of such a por-
tion should probably be called “opinion decretal language” to 
distinguish it from “judgment decretal language,” but in this 
article, such language will be called simply “decretal language.” 
2. Clarity. The first rule is clarity. The decretal 
language must tell the district judge what the appellate court 
wants done. Phrases such as “judgment in accordance with 
opinion” or “judgment in conformity with opinion” should be 
avoided if practicable, although they are sometimes used, 
especially where the opinion includes complicated language.1 
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 1 See, e.g., Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 53 F.3d 549, 565 (2d Cir. 1995) 
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Similarly, lawyers would be well advised to tell appellate 
courts precisely what relief they are seeking. 
3. Consistency. The decretal language should be consis-
tent throughout the opinion, i.e., in the “syllabus” that immedi-
ately follows the caption, in any summary of the disposition in 
the opening paragraphs of the opinion, and in the “conclusion.” 
There is no need, however, for the language of the syllabus or 
the opening paragraphs to be as detailed as the language in the 
conclusion. The conclusion is the place where the decretal lan-
guage should be stated completely and with precision. For ex-
ample, the syllabus might say only “Affirmed in part; reversed 
in part and remanded.”  
4. Affirmance. If a judgment is to be affirmed, the 
decretal language of an appellate opinion need say only “The 
judgment of the district court is affirmed.” 
5. Vacatur or Reversal. If a judgment is to be undone, at 
least in some respect, there is a difference of opinion among 
judges as to the circumstances in which “vacated” or “reversed” 
should be used in decretal language. However, in three 
circumstances, there is virtual unanimity as to which of these 
verbs should be used: 
(a) If the appellate ruling orders the complete opposite of 
what the district court has ruled, e.g., the district court has 
entered judgment for the plaintiff (for example, on a motion for 
summary judgment) and the court of appeals orders entry of 
judgment for the defendant (for example, a Rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissal for failure to state a claim), the decretal language 
should include the word “reversed.” An appropriate form would 
be “The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case 
[or the appeal or the cause] is remanded with directions to 
enter judgment for the defendant.” 
(b) If the appellate ruling rejects interim relief ordered 
by the district court (for example, a preliminary injunction), the 
decretal language should include the word “vacated.” An 
appropriate form would be “The order of the district court 
issuing a preliminary injunction is vacated” or sometimes just 
“The injunction issued by the district court is vacated.” 
(c) If the appellate ruling rejects a sentence imposed by 
the district court and the appellate court chooses to undo the 
  
(“Judgment in accordance with opinion.”); Hight v. United States, 256 F.2d 795, 802 
(2d Cir. 1958) (“[J]udgment in conformity with this opinion.”). 
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sentence, rather than order the district court to undo it,2 the 
decretal language should include the word “vacated.”3 An 
appropriate form would be “The sentence is vacated, and the 
case is remanded for resentencing consistent with this 
opinion.”  
In the many circumstances where an appellate court 
rejects a final judgment of a district court but does not order 
the complete opposite of what the district court has done (i.e., 
does not direct judgment for the appellant), the practices of 
appellate judges vary as to whether the decretal language 
should include the word “vacated” or “reversed.” Some judges 
believe that “reversed” should never be used unless the 
appellate court directs the complete opposite of what the 
district court has ordered. For these judges, whenever the 
appellate ruling is in favor of the appellant but orders anything 
less than the complete opposite of what the district court has 
ruled (for example, the district court has entered summary 
judgment for the plaintiff and the court of appeals rules that a 
factual issue exists that requires a trial), the decretal language 
will include the word “vacated.” An appropriate form would be 
“The judgment of the district court is vacated, and the case [or 
the appeal or the cause] is remanded for trial [or for further 
proceedings].” Even these judges, however, will frequently say 
that they are “reversing” the ruling that grants summary 
judgment for the plaintiff, but are “vacating” the judgment that 
was entered based on that ruling. 
Other judges believe that “reversed” is appropriate 
whenever the appellate court, on an appeal from a final 
judgment, rules in favor of the appellant, even though the 
appellant does not win the complete opposite of the district 
court’s ruling. For these judges, an appropriate form in the 
example just given would be “The judgment of the district court 
is reversed, and the case [or the appeal or the cause] is 
remanded for trial [or for further proceedings].” 
There is very little case law on the issue of “reversed” 
versus “vacated.” In Mickens v. Taylor4 Justice Scalia’s opinion 
for the Supreme Court emphasized that a prior ruling of the 
Court in Wood v. Georgia5 had only “vacated” the judgment of 
  
 2 See para. 7, infra. 
 3 But see para. 8, infra. 
 4 535 U.S. 162 (2002). 
 5 450 U.S. 261 (1981). 
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the lower court and had remanded for further proceedings (an 
inquiry concerning an allegedly conflicted counsel), rather than 
“reversed” and overturned a conviction.6 The implication of 
Justice Scalia’s language is that “reversed” would have been 
appropriate if the prior ruling had overturned the conviction, 
but it should be noted that such a ruling would only have 
required a new trial, not a final judgment in favor of the 
defendant. 
The Supreme Court has frequently used “reversed” in 
the decretal language of an opinion, even though the opinion 
did not direct entry of judgment for the appellant.7  
I have not found a decision that attached any 
significance to the use of “reversed,” rather than “vacated,” 
where the appellant prevailed on the issues raised on appeal 
but did not win a district court judgment in its favor. 
In Dart v. United States8 the District of Columbia 
Circuit held that statutory language authorizing the Secretary 
of Commerce to “vacate or modify” the decisions of 
administrative law judges did not empower the Secretary to 
reverse such decisions, and that where an ALJ had decided not 
to award sanctions, the Secretary’s order that the judgment be 
modified so as to award sanctions constituted an impermissible 
reversal of the ALJ’s decision.9  
In Kelso v. U.S. Department of State10 the district court 
offered the following explanation: “Although the word reverse 
shares vacate’s meanings of to annul and to set aside, it has an 
additional, more extensive definition: ‘To reverse a judgment 
means to overthrow it by contrary decision, make it void, undo 
or annul it for error.’”11  
6. Affirmed or reversed (or vacated) in part. Whenever 
an appellate decision affirms part of a district court’s ruling 
and reverses (or vacates) part of that ruling, the decretal 
language should specify which parts are affirmed and which 
parts are reversed [or vacated]. “Affirmed in part and reversed 
in part” is not sufficient in the decretal language (although it 
  
 6 Mickens, 535 U.S. at 172 n.3. 
 7 See, e.g., Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 509 
(2001) (remand for reconsideration of res judicata defense under applicable state law 
standard); Cent. Green Co. v. United States, 531 U.S. 425, 437 (2001) (remand for 
reconsideration of immunity defense under proper standard). 
 8 848 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 9 Id. at 227-31. 
 10 13 F. Supp. 2d 12 (D.D.C. 1998). 
 11 Id. at 18 (citations omitted). 
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will do in the “syllabus,” the short explanation of the nature of 
the appeal and the disposition that appears in the slip opinion 
just below the caption). 
7. Remands. In every instance where an appellate court 
reverses or vacates (either in whole or in part), the decretal 
language should include language that remands the case to the 
district court (although the absence of the word “remand” in a 
judgment that “reverses” has been held not to deprive the 
district court of jurisdiction to act),12. The remand language 
should tell the district judge what is to be done. Usually, some 
precise task will be identified, e.g., “remanded for further 
findings,” “remanded with directions to grant leave to amend 
the complaint,” or “remanded for trial.” When an appellate 
court reverses (or vacates) a grant of summary judgment, the 
remand sometimes directs a trial, but in some circumstances 
the appellate court simply wants to permit more discovery with 
the possibility of a renewed motion for summary judgment, in 
which event the remand directs “further proceedings.” 
Two forms of catch-all remands have also been used: 
“remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion”13 and “remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.”14 I have seen no case law that attached a 
consequence to the choice between these two catch-all 
formulations. Some judges believe that the “consistent with” 
formulation is a somewhat more confining direction to the 
district judge. The Supreme Court has used both formulations.15  
The “consistent with” and “not inconsistent with” 
formulations appear to have come into use in an earlier era 
before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, which now provide that the mandate of the Court of 
Appeals includes the opinion, as well as the judgment.16 In Gulf 
Refining Co, v. U.S.,17 before the adoption of Rule 41, the 
Supreme Court ruled that “the direction to proceed consistently 
with the opinion of the court has the effect of making the 
  
 12 See Exxon Chemical Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 137 F.3d 1475, 1483-
84 (Fed. Cir. 1998)) 
 13 E.g., Scott v. Coughlin, 344 F.3d 282, 291 (2d Cir. 2004) (footnote omitted). 
 14 E.g., Weiler v. Chatham Forest Products, Inc., 370 F.3d 339, 346 (2d Cir. 
2004). 
 15 See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (“not inconsistent 
with”); Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 422 (2002) (“consistent with”). 
 16 See FED. R. APP. P. 41. 
 17 269 U.S. 125 (1925). 
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opinion a part of the mandate, as though it had been therein 
set out at length.”18  
8. Sentences. When an appellate ruling rejects some 
aspect of a district judge’s sentence, an issue arises as to 
whether the order vacating the sentence should be entered by 
the appellate court or the district court. If the appellate court 
vacates the sentence, there is then no sentence, and 
circumstances might arise where the appellate court would not 
wish to leave the defendant unsentenced in the interim before 
resentencing occurs. In such circumstances, it is sometimes 
preferable for the appellate court not to vacate the sentence but 
simply to remand to the district court with instructions 
concerning the sentence; that way, the sentence remains in 
place until changed by the district court. In altering a sentence, 
an appellate court should consider whether it wants to alter 
one part of the sentence and leave the remainder in place, or 
alter one part and grant the district judge discretion to reshape 
the entire sentence de novo.19  
9. Modification. Sometimes an appellate ruling effects a 
change in a district court ruling without either vacating or 
reversing. Instead, the appellate ruling “modifies” the appealed 
judgment. For example, an appellate change in the wording of 
an injunction might say “The order of the District Court issuing 
the injunction is modified by deleting paragraph 7, and as 
modified the order is affirmed.”20  
10. Dismissal. If a court of appeals does not have 
appellate jurisdiction over the appeal, the appeal should be 
dismissed. “Dismissed” is the appropriate word in decretal 
language when an appeal is dismissed as untimely, or because 
the judgment or order appealed from is not final and no basis 
exists for appeal from a non-final order. Other circumstances 
where an appeal should be dismissed are unsuccessful 
attempts to obtain review of orders denying judgment for a 
defendant on the basis of qualified immunity,21 or unsuccessful 
attempts to obtain review of a sentencing judge’s discretionary 
  
 18 Id. at 135. See also U.S. v. Pan-American Petroleum Co., 24 F.2d 206, 207 
(S.D. Cal. 1927) (same).  
 19 See United States v. Quintieri, 306 F.3d 1217 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 20 See, e.g., Guzman v. Bevona, 90 F.3d 641, 650 (2d Cir. 1996); United States 
v. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444, 460 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 21 E.g., Locurto v. Safir, 264 F.3d 154, 170 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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decision not to depart from an applicable Sentencing 
Guidelines range.22 
11. “Appeal” versus “review.” In the course of framing 
decretal language, courts should distinguish between the terms 
“appeal” and “review.” “Appeal” is the proper term for referring 
to the process by which an appellate court exercises its 
jurisdiction over an appealable judgment or order; “review” is 
the proper term for referring to the action of an appellate court 
in considering an issue or ruling comprehended within an 
appeal. For example, on an appeal from a judgment in favor of 
a defendant after a jury verdict, the plaintiff-appellant might 
contend that the district court erred in denying its motion to 
amend the complaint. In such circumstances, it would be 
incorrect for the decretal language to say, after affirming the 
judgment, “And we also affirm on the appeal from the denial of 
the plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint.” There is no 
“appeal” from the ruling denying the motion to amend. The 
“appeal” is from the final judgment, and on that appeal, the 
court of appeals “reviews” the denial of the motion to amend. 
Thus, appropriate language would be “And on review of the 
ruling denying the plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint, 
we affirm” or, more simply, “And we affirm the denial of the 
plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint.” 
12. Identifying the district court ruling. Whatever the 
appellate disposition, the decretal language should be careful 
to refer correctly to the nature of the district court ruling, i.e., 
whether it is a “judgment” or an “order.” And when referring to 
a district court’s judgment or order by its date, the operative 
date is the date on which the judgment or order was entered on 
the docket of the district court, not the date when the district 
judge signed the opinion or the date when the clerk filed the 
judgment.23  The date that the judgment or order was entered 
can be ascertained from the district court’s docket entries.24 
13. Review of agency rulings. On applications to review 
administrative agencies like the National Labor Relations 
Board, which come to a court of appeals on a “petition for 
review” or the Board’s “petition to enforce,” the decretal 
language is either “petition to review granted, and the order of 
the Board is vacated [sometimes with a remand]” or “petition 
  
 22 E.g., United States v. Aponte, 235 F.3d 802, 803 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 23 See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A).  
 24 See Houston v. Greiner, 174 F.3d 287 (2d Cir. 1999) (discussing form of 
docket entries). 
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for review denied” or “petition for enforcement granted” or 
“petition for enforcement denied.” 
14. Motions. For disposition of motions, the decretal 
language, entered on the motion itself, is usually just “motion 
granted” or “motion denied.” 
15. Returning a case to the same panel. Sometimes the 
panel deciding an appeal wants a subsequent appeal in the 
litigation assigned to it. The most common circumstance is 
where the panel has remanded for a finding. Having invested 
time considering the issues in the appeal, the panel will 
normally want the case returned to it after the needed finding 
has been made. Sometimes the panel wants a subsequent 
appeal in the litigation to come before it, regardless of what 
prompted the remand. 
The language used to accomplish a return of the case to 
the panel deciding the initial appeal should be carefully 
considered. Some panels have been using formulas such as 
“This panel will retain jurisdiction,”25 “Jurisdiction will be 
retained by this panel,”26 or simply “Jurisdiction is retained.”27 
These formulations should be avoided. They are jurisdictionally 
incorrect. A court of appeals cannot simultaneously “retain” 
jurisdiction and send the case back to a district court for some 
further action. Whenever the panel wants a district court to 
take any further action in the case, jurisdiction must be 
restored to the district court. This occurs by means of the 
issuance of a mandate by the court of appeals. The “retain” 
wording is a euphemism that really means “This panel will 
reacquire jurisdiction after the required action has been taken.”  
Bringing a case back to the original panel can be 
accomplished in either of two ways: 
(a) If the panel remands for a specific task such as a 
finding, the usual technique is to “vacate and remand” and add 
something like “After the district court has made the finding 
required by this opinion, jurisdiction will automatically be 
restored to this Court without the need for an additional notice 
of appeal; the returned appeal will be assigned to this panel.” 
or “After the district court has made the required finding, 
either party may restore jurisdiction to this Court by notifying 
the Clerk of this Court by letter that the finding has been 
  
 25 E.g., United States v. Eng, 971 F.2d 854, 864 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 26 E.g., Cardillo v. United States, 767 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 27 E.g., Abrams v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 938 F.2d 22, 26 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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made, and the returned appeal will be assigned to this panel. 
An additional notice of appeal will not be needed.” In the 
Second Circuit, this technique is known as a Jacobson 
remand28. It is used when the case is almost certainly going to 
return, and there is no need for a second notice of appeal 
(which, in addition to requiring an additional docketing fee, 
risks confusion in the clerk’s office because there will then be 
two docket numbers for what is really the same appeal; every 
notice of appeal precipitates a new docket number). However 
worded, a Jacobson remand should specify the procedure for 
returning the case to the jurisdiction of the court of appeals. It 
is often useful to add something like “If any circumstances 
obviate the need for the case to return to the court of appeals, 
the parties shall promptly notify the Clerk of this Court.” 
(b) If the panel remands for some more general purpose, 
such as a retrial, but wants a subsequent appeal, if it occurs, 
assigned to it, the appropriate language, in addition to “vacated 
and remanded for a new trial” is something like “In the event of 
a subsequent appeal, the matter will be assigned to this panel.” 
In the Second Circuit, if no direction concerning 
assignment to the original panel is stated and an appeal is 
taken that relates to a prior appeal, the clerk’s office will assign 
the appeal to the next panel that includes one judge of the 
Second Circuit who was a member of the prior panel. 
16. Costs. It is usually helpful to make a decision as to 
appellate costs at the time an opinion is filed. FRAP 39(a) 
provides that, unless the court otherwise directs, if the 
judgment or order is affirmed, the appellee recovers its costs; if 
the judgment or order is reversed, the appellant recovers its 
costs; if there is a mixed outcome, e.g., “affirmed in part and 
vacated in part,” or if the judgment is vacated or modified, 
neither party is awarded costs. It should be noted that use of 
the word “vacated” without any direction for costs has the 
effect of denying costs. All of these costs outcomes can be 
altered by direction of the court of appeals. 
If nothing is said about costs in the decretal language, 
the panel will usually be burdened by a motion from one side or 
the other (or both) to award costs or to disallow costs. It is 
simpler to take care of the matter in the original opinion. If the 
opinion directs a mixed outcome, appellate costs can be 
apportioned, e.g., “The appellant may recover 2/3 of its costs.” 
  
 28 See United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19, 21-23 (2d Cir. 1994) 
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Sometimes a panel will disallow costs even though the 
prevailing party is normally entitled to them. This has 
happened, for example, when an impoverished appellant with a 
non-frivolous claim loses to a large corporation. In that 
circumstance, the decretal language sometimes says “No costs.” 
The fact that a party has been permitted to appeal in 
forma pauperis does not exempt it from appellate costs; in 
forma pauperis status exempts a party only from the obligation 
to prepay required fees.29 
17. Sanctions for frivolous appeal. If an appeal is 
deemed frivolous, an appellate court may award damages 
(usually, attorney’s fees) plus double costs.30 Unless the 
appellee asks for such sanctions and thereby gives the 
appellant notice, the court of appeals may not summarily 
impose sanctions, but must first issue an order requiring the 
appellant to show cause why sanctions for a frivolous appeal 
should not be imposed.31  
18. Issuance of mandate. Sometimes decretal language 
specifies the date when the mandate will issue. The mandate is 
the formal document that transmits the disposition by the 
court of appeals to the district court. It consists of the court of 
appeals opinion, a certified copy of the judgment (the judgment 
is prepared by the clerk’s office), and any direction as to costs.32 
In the absence of any contrary direction, the mandate issues 7 
days after the time to file a petition for rehearing (14 days) 
expires (i.e., 21 days after entry of the judgment of the court of 
appeals), or 7 days after entry of an order denying a timely 
petition for rehearing or motion to stay the mandate, 
whichever is later.33 A timely petition for rehearing 
automatically stays issuance of the mandate until the petition 
is adjudicated.34 
In some cases a panel wants its ruling to take effect 
immediately. The decretal language should add “The mandate 
shall issue forthwith.” This language, however, does not make 
the appellate ruling effective on the date that the opinion is 
filed. The effective date is the date when the mandate is 
  
 29 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (2000); FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(2). 
 30 See FED. R. APP. P. 38.  
 31 See DeLuca v. Long Island Lighting Co., 862 F.2d 427, 430 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 32 See FED. R. APP. P. 41(a).  
 33 See FED. R. APP. P.  41(b).  
 34 See FED. R. APP. P.  41(d)(1). 
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issued,35 even if the mandate is not received by the district 
court on that date. If a court of appeals wants its ruling to 
become effective on the date the opinion is filed, it should make 
sure that the clerk of the court issues the mandate that day. 
In some cases the panel wants to have the mandate 
delayed, usually to permit the losing party to have extra time 
to seek a stay from the Supreme Court.36  
19. Altering a Court of Appeals opinion. On occasion, a 
court of appeals makes some change in its own prior ruling. In 
the Second Circuit, this can be accomplished in one of four 
ways: (a) if a minor wording change is to be made, the author of 
the opinion files an “errata sheet” (on a prescribed form) 
correcting the slip opinion; (b) if a more extensive change is to 
be made, the panel files an unpublished order directing the 
change; (c) if a change is to be made that the panel wants 
published in the Federal Reporter, a brief opinion making the 
change is filed, (d) if extensive changes are to be made, the 
panel files an amended opinion, in which event a new slip 
opinion is printed. Whenever any changes are made, a revised 
disk containing the opinion as corrected is sent to the clerk’s 
office so that a corrected version of the opinion will be placed on 
line. If a change is to be made after the mandate has issued, 
the amending order must recite that the mandate is being 
recalled.  
* * * * * 
The foregoing describes practices in the Second Circuit. 
Variations undoubtedly occur in the other circuits. Although 
this Article will not end with any decretal language, it is my 
hope that the discussion of decretal language will be useful to 
the bench and the bar. 
         
 
  
 35 See United States v. DiLapi, 651 F.2d 140, 144 n.3 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. 
denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982). 
 36 See, e.g., Mohammed v. Reno, 309 F.3d 95, 103 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 
